Forthcoming
Cartwright, N., Foglesong, S., Furman, K., Hyde, BVE., Nyberg, G., Ortiz Villa, K. and Slanickova, H. (Forthcoming). “Towards a Theory of Objectivity for Activist Research.” Emerging Scholars Initiative Press at the University of Pretoria.
Cartwright, N. and Cowen, N. (Forthcoming). “Disagreement about Evidence and Evidence Based Policy.” In M. Baghramian, J. A. Carter and R. Cosker-Rowland (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge.
2024
Cartwright, N. and Ray, F. (2024). “Modelling Objectively.” In R. Erdbeer, V. Hagenmeyer and K. Stierstorfer (Eds.), Modelling the Energy Transition: Cultures, Visions, Narratives. Palgrave Macmillan.
Cartwright, N. (2024). “Evidence, Relevance and Warrant: In Defence of Voluntarism.” In C. Beisbart and M. Frauchiger (Eds.), Scientific Theories and Philosophical Stances: Themes from van Fraassen. De Gruyter, pp. 193–206. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111019802-013.
2023
Cartwright, N. and Ray, F. (2023). “Objectivity and Intellectual Humility in Scientific Research: They’re Harder Than You Think.” European Review, 31(4), pp. 367–381. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798723000091.
Joyce, K. E. and Cartwright, N. (2023) “How Should Evidence Inform Education Policy?” In R. Curren (Ed.), Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Routledge, pp. 90–102.
2022
Cartwright, N. (2022). “How to Learn about Causes in the Single Case.” In J. Widner, M. Woolcock and D. Ortega Nieto (Eds.), The Case for Case Studies: Methods and Applications in International Development. Cambridge University Press, pp. 29–51. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108688253.003.
2021
Cartwright, N. (2021). “Rigour Versus the Need for Evidential Diversity.” Synthese, 199, pp. 13095–13119. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03368-1.
2020
Joyce, K. E. and Cartwright, N. (2020). “Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice: Predicting What Will Work Locally.” American Educational Research Journal, 57(3), pp. 1045–1082. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3102/0002831219866687.
Cartwright, N. (2020). “Why Trust Science? Reliability, Particularity and the Tangle of Science.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 120(3), pp. 237–252. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa015.
Cartwright, N., Charlton, L., Juden, M., Munslow, T. and Williams, R. B. (2020). “Making Predictions of Programme Success More Reliable.” CEDIL Methods Working Paper. Oxford: Centre of Excellence for Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL). DOI: https://doi.org/10.51744/CMWP1.
Cartwright, N. (2020). “Using Middle-Level Theory to Improve Programme and Evaluation Design.” CEDIL Methods Brief. Oxford: Centre of Excellence for Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL). DOI: https://doi.org/10.51744/CMB1.
Cartwright, N. and Pemberton, J. (2020). “Causal Processes – A Social Policy Example.” Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2020-01.
Cartwright, N., Pemberton, J. and Wieten, S. (2020). “Mechanisms, Laws and Explanation.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 10, 25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-00284-y.
Cartwright, N. (2020). “Middle-Range Theory: Without It What Could Anyone Do? (Lullius Lectures 2018).” THEORIA: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35(3), pp. 269–323. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21479.
Cowen, N. and Cartwright, N. (2020). “Street-Level Theories of Change: Adapting the Medical Model of Evidence-based Practice for Policing.” In N. Fielding., K. Bullock and S. Holdaway (Eds.), Critical Reflections on Evidence-Based Policing. Routledge, pp. 52–71.
2019
Cartwright, N. (2019). “What Is Meant by ‘Rigour’ in Evidence-Based Educational Policy and What’s So Good About It?” Educational Research and Evaluation, 25(1–2), pp. 63–80. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13803611.2019.1617990.
Cartwright, N. (2019). “Commentary: Why Mixed Methods Are Necessary for Evaluating Any Policy.” In M. Nagatsu and A. Ruzzene (Eds.), Contemporary Philosophy and Social Science: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue. Bloomsbury, pp. 173–184.
2018
Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2018). “Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized Controlled Trials.” Social Science & Medicine, 210, pp. 2–21. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.12.005.
Cartwright, N., Pemberton, J. and Wieten, S. (2018). “Mechanisms, Ceteris Paribus Laws and Covering-Law Explanation.” Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2018-04. Also as Working Paper: Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, LSE, London, UK.
Game, E. T., Tallis, H., Olander, L., Alexander, S. M., Busch, J., Cartwright, N., Kalies, E. L., Masuda, Y. J., Mupepele, A., Qiu, J., Rooney, A., Sills, E. and Sutherland, W. J. (2018). “Cross-Disciplinary Evidence Principles for Sustainability Policy.” Nature Sustainability, 1(9), pp. 452–454. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-018-0141-x.
Oliver, S., Roche, C., Stewart, R., Bangpan, M., Dickson, K., Pells, K., Cartwright, N., Hargreaves, J. and Gough, D. (2018). “Stakeholder Engagement for Development Impact Evaluation and Evidence Synthesis.” The Centre of Excellence for Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL) Inception Papers.
Davey, C., Hassan, S., Cartwright, N., Humphreys, M., Masset, E., Prost,
A., Gough, D., Oliver, S., Bonell, C. and Hargreaves, J. (2018). “Designing Evaluations to Provide Evidence to Inform Action in New Settings.” The Centre of Excellence for Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL) Inception Papers.
Cartwright, N. (2018). “Will Your Policy Work? Experiments Versus Models.” In I.F. Peschard and B.C. van Fraassen (Eds.), The Experimental Side of Modeling. University of Minnesota Press, pp. 148–167.
Cartwright, N. (2018). “What Evidence Should Guidelines Take Note Of?“ Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 24(5), pp. 1139–1144. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.12959.
Cartwright, N. and Merlussi, P. (2018). “Are Laws of Nature Consistent with Contingency?” In W. Ott and L. Patton (Eds.), Laws of Nature. Oxford University Press, pp. 221–244. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746775.003.0012. Reprinted in N. Cartwright, Nature, the Artful Modeler: Lectures on Laws, Science, How Nature Arranges the World and How We Can Arrange It Better. Open Court, pp. 111-140.
Joyce, K. E. and Cartwright, N. (2018). “Meeting Our Standards for Educational Justice: Doing Our Best with the Evidence.” Theory and Research in Education, 16(1), pp. 3–22. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878518756565.
Cartwright, N. (2018). “Theoretical Practices That Work: Those That Mimic Nature’s Own.” Spontaneous Generations, 9(1), pp. 165–173. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.27045.
Marcellesi, A. and Cartwright, N. (2018). “Modeling Mitigation and Adaptation Policies to Predict Their Effectiveness: The Limits of Randomized Controlled Trials.” In E. A. Lloyd and E. Winsberg and(Eds.), Climate Modeling: Philosophical and Conceptual Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 449–480. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65058-6_15.
2017
Rutter, M., Breckenridge, A., Cartwright, N., et al. (2017). “Sources of Evidence for Assessing the Safety, Efficacy and Effectiveness of Medicines.” Academy of Medical Sciences Working Group Report.
Bradburn. N., Cartwright, N. and Fuller. J. (2017). “A Theory of Measurement.” In L. McClimans (Ed), Measurement in Medicine: Philosophical Essays on Assessment and Evaluation. Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 71–88.
Cowen, N., Virk, B., Mascarenhas-Keyes, S. and Cartwright, N. (2017). “Randomized Controlled Trials: How Can We Know ‘What Works’?” Critical Review, 29(3), pp. 265–292. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2017.1395223.
Bateson, P., Cartwright, N., Dupré, J., Laland, K. and Noble, D. (2017). “Introduction: New Trends in Evolutionary Biology: Biological, Philosophical and Social Science Perspectives.” Interface Focus, 7(5), pp. 1–3. DOI: http://doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2017.0051.
Cartwright, N. (2017). “Can Structural Equations Explain How Mechanisms Explain?” In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. Price (Eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford University Press, pp. 132–152. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0008.
Cartwright, N. (2017). “Causal Powers: Why Humeans Can’t Even Be Instrumentalists.” In J. D. Jacobs (Ed.), Causal Powers. Oxford University Press, pp. 9–23. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198796572.003.0002.
Bhakthavatsalam, S. and Cartwright, N. (2017). “What’s So Special about Empirical Adequacy?.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7, pp. 445–465. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0171-7
Cartwright, N. and Hardie, J. (2017). “Predicting What Will Happen When You Intervene.” Clinical Social Work Journal, 45, pp. 270–279. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10615-016-0615-0.
Cartwright, N. (2017). “Big Systems Versus Stocky Tangles: It Can Matter to the Details.” Erkenntnis, 83, pp. 3–19. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9869-8.
Cartwright, N. (2017). “Single Case Causes: What Is Evidence and Why.” In HK. Chao and J. Reiss (Eds.) Philosophy of Science in Practice: Nancy Cartwright and the Nature of Scientific Reasoning (Synthese Library, vol 379). Springer, pp. 11–24. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45532-7_2.
2016
Deaton, A. and Cartwright, N. (2016). “The Limitations of Randomised Controlled Trials.” VoxEU Column, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/limitations-randomised-controlled-trials.
Cartwright, N. (2016). “Where’s the Rigor When You Need It?” In I. Marinovic (Ed.), Causal Inferences in Capital Markets Research, a special issue of Foundations and Trends® in Accounting, 10(2–4), pp. 106–124. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1400000045.
Cartwright, N. (2016). “Loose Talk Kills: What’s Worrying about Unity of Method.” Philosophy of Science, 83(5), pp. 768–778. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/687862.
Cartwright, N. (2016). “Contingency and the Order of Nature.” In P. Harrison and I. Hesketh (Eds.), Replaying the Tape of Life: Evolution and Historical Explanation, a special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 58, pp. 56–63. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.12.008.
Cartwright, N. and Marcellesi, A. (2016). “Deliberating Policy: Where Morals and Methods Mix.” In M. Couch and J. Pfeifer (Eds.), The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher. Oxford University Press, pp. 229–252. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381357.003.0010.
Cartwright, N. (2016). “The Natural and the Moral Order. What’s to Blame?” In W. Doniger, P. Galison and S. Neiman (Eds.), What Reason Promises. De Gruyter, pp. 13–18. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110455113-004.
Cartwright, N. (2016). “The Dethronement of Laws in Science.” In N. Cartwright and K. Ward (Eds.), Rethinking Order: After the Laws of Nature. Bloomsbury, pp. 26–52.
Cartwright, N. and Davis, J. B. (2016). “Economics as Science.” In R. Skidelsky and N. Craig (Eds.), Who Runs the Economy? The Role of Power in Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 43–55. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58017-7_4.
2015
Cartwright, N. (2015). “Scientific Models Versus Social Reality.” Building Research & Information, 44(3), pp. 334–337. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09613218.2015.1083811.
Cartwright, N. (2015). “Philosophy of Social Technology: Get on Board (The Dewey Lecture 2015).” Proceedings and Addresses of the APA.
Cartwright, N. (2015). “How Could Laws Make Things Happen?” In N. Spurway (Ed.), Laws of Nature, Laws of God? Proceedings of the Science and Religion Forum Conference 2014. Cambridge Scholars, pp. 115–135.
Cowen, N., Cartwright, N., Virk, B. and Mascarenhas-Keyes, S. (2015). “Making the Most of the Evidence: Evidence-Based Policy in the Classroom.” Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2015-03.
Cartwright, N. and Marcellesi, A. (2015). “EBP: Where Rigor Matters.” In C. E. Crangle, A. Garcia de la Sienra and H. E. Longino (Eds.), Foundations and Methods from Mathematics to Neuroscience: Essays Inspired by Patrick Suppes. The University of Chicago Press (Distributed for CSLI Publications).
2014
Cowen, N. and Cartwright, N. (2014). “Making the Most of the Evidence in Education: A Guide for Working Out What Works… Here and Now.” Durham University: CHESS Working Paper No. 2014-03.
Pemberton, J. and Cartwright, N. (2014). “Ceteris Paribus Laws Need Machines to Generate Them.” Erkenntnis 79(10), pp. 1745–1758. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9639-4.
Cartwright, N. and Runhardt, R. (2014). “Measurement.” In N. Cartwright and E. Montuschi (Eds.), Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction. Oxford University Press, pp. 265–287.
Cartwright, N. (2014). “Causal Inference.” In N. Cartwright and E. Montuschi (Eds.), Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction. Oxford University Press, pp. 308–326.
2013
Cartwright, N. (2013). “Evidence, Argument and Prediction.” In V. Karakostas and D. Dieks (Eds.), EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science (The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 2). Springer, pp. 3–17. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_1.
Cartwright, N. (2013). “God’s Order, Man’s Order and the Order of Nature.” Euresis Journal, 5, pp. 99–108.
Cartwright, N. (2013). “Knowing What We Are Talking About: Why Evidence Doesn’t Always Travel.” Evidence and Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice, 9(1), pp. 97–112. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1332/174426413X662581.
2012
Cartwright, N. and Pemberton, J. (2013). “Aristotelian Powers: Without Them, What Would Modern Science Do?” In J. Greco and R. Groff (Eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. Routledge, pp. 93–112.
Cartwright, N. and Martin, E. (2012). “Queen Physics: How Much of the World is Painted Red.” In F. Watts and C. C. Knight (Eds.), God and the Scientist: Exploring the Work of John Polkinghorne. Ashgate Publishing, pp. 67–75.
Cartwright, N. (2012). “RCTs, Evidence and Predicting Policy Effectiveness.” In H. Kincaid (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press, pp. 298–318. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392753.013.0013.
Rol, M. and Cartwright, N. (2012). “Warranting the Use of Causal Claims: A Non-Trivial Case for Interdisciplinarity.” THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, 27(2), pp. 189–202. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.4075.
Cartwright, N. (2012). “A Question of Nonsense.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 63, pp. 102–116.
Cartwright, N. (2012). “Presidential Address: Will This Policy Work for You? Predicting Effectiveness Better: How Philosophy Helps.” Philosophy of Science, 79(5), pp. 973–989. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/668041.
2011
Cartwright, N. (2011). “A Philosophers View of the Long Road from RCTs to Effectiveness.” The Lancet, 377(9775), pp. 1400–1401. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60563-1.
Cartwright, N. (2011). “Predicting What Will Happen When We Act: What Counts for Warrant?” Preventive Medicine 53: pp. 221–224. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2011.08.011.
Steed, S., Contessa, G., and Cartwright, N. (2011). “Keeping Track of Neurath’s Bill: Abstract Concepts, Stock Models and the Unity of Classical Physics.” In J. Symons, O. Pombo and J. M. Torres (Eds.), Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science. Springer, pp. 95–108. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0143-4_8.
Cartwright, N. and Efstathiou, S. (2011). “Hunting Causes and Using Them: Is There No Bridge from Here to There?” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 25(3), pp. 223–241. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2011.605245.
Cartwright, N. (2011). “Evidence, External Validity and Explanatory Relevance.” In G. J. Morgan (Ed.), Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press, pp. 15–28. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738625.003.0002.
Cartwright, N. (2011). “Predicting ‘It Will Work for Us’: (Way) beyond statistics.” In P. M. Illari, F. Russo, and J. Williamson (Eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press, pp. 750–768. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.003.0035.
Cartwright, N. and Stegenga, J. (2011). “A Theory of Evidence for Evidence-Based Policy.” In P. Dawid, W. Twining. and M. Vasilaki (Eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry (Proceedings of the British Academy). Oxford University Press, pp. 290–322. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264843.003.0011.
Cartwright, N. and Bradburn, N. (2011). “The Theory of Measurement.” In R. M. Li (Ed.), The Importance of Common Metrics for Advancing Social Science Theory and Research: A Workshop Summary. The National Academies Press, pp. 53–70.
2010
Cartwright, N. (2010). “Foreword.” In J. Woods (Ed.), Fictions and Models: New Essays. Philosophia Verlag, pp. 9–20. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2nrzgsf.3.
Cartwright, N. (2010). “Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics By Nancy Cartwright: Summary.” Analysis, 70(2), pp. 307–310. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp157.
Cartwright, N. (2010). “Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics By Nancy Cartwright: Comments on Longworth and Weber.” Analysis, 70(2), pp. 325–330. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp158.
Cartwright, N. (2010). “Models: Parables v Fables.” In R. Frigg, and M. Hunter (Eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science. Springer, pp. 19–31. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3851-7_2. Also printed in Insights, 1(11), pp. 2–10, 2008.
Bovens, L. and Cartwright, N. (2010). “Measuring the Impact of Philosophy.” Science and Technology Parliamentary Committee Papers – Research Funding Cuts, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/memo/spendingcuts/uc8302.htm.
Cartwright, N. and Munro, E. (2010). “The Limitations of RCTs in Predicting Effectiveness.” Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 16(2), pp. 260–266. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2753.2010.01382.x.
Cartwright, N. (2010). “What are Randomised Controlled Trials Good For?” Philosophical Studies, 147(1), pp. 59–70. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9450-2.
Cartwright, N. (2010). “Reply to Steel and Pearl — Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics, Nancy Cartwright. Cambridge University Press, 2008, x + 270 pages.” Economics and Philosophy, 26(1), pp. 87–94. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267110000088.
Fennell, D. and Cartwright, N. (2010). “Does Roush Show Evidence Should Be Probable?” Synthese, 175(3), pp. 289–310. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9510-3.
Cartwright, N. (2010) “Relativism in the Philosophy of Science.” In M. Krausz (Ed.), Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology. Columbia University Press, pp. 86–99.
Cartwright, N. (2010). “Natural Laws and the Closure of Physics.” In R. Y. Chiao, M. L. Cohen, A. J. Leggett, W. D. Phillips and C. L. Harper (Eds.), Visions of Discovery. New Light on Physics, Cosmology and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press, pp. 612–622.
2009
Cartwright, N., Goldfinch, A. and Howick, J. (2009). “Evidence-Based Policy: Where Is Our Theory of Evidence?” Journal of Children’s Services, 4(4), pp. 6–14. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5042/jcs.2010.0017. Also printed in (2008) A. Beckermann, H. Tetens and S. Walter (Eds.), Philosophy: Foundations and Applications, Main Lectures and Colloquia Talks of the German Analytic Philosophy Conference GAP, Mentis. Also printed in (2007) Technical Report 02/07, Contingency and Dissent in Science Series. CPNSS, LSE.
Cartwright, N. (2009). “Presidential Address: How To Do Things with Causes.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 83(2): pp. 5–22.
Cartwright, N. (2009). “Measuring Research Impact: Special Problems.” Report for the Research Excellence Framework Consultation. London: Consortium of Institutes of Advanced Study.
Cartwright, N. (2009). “What Is This Thing Called ‘Efficacy’?” In C. Mantzavinos (Ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press, pp. 185–206. DOI: DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812880.016.
Cartwright, N. (2009). “Evidence-Based Policy: What’s to Be Done About Relevance?” Philosophical Studies, 143(1), pp. 127–136. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9311-4.
Cartwright, N. (2009). “Causality, Invariance, and Policy.” In H. Kincaid and D. Ross (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Oxford University Press, pp. 410-423. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195189254.003.0015.
Cartwright, N. (2009). “Why be Hanged for Even a Lamb?” In B. Monton (Ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Oxford University Press, pp. 32–45. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0003.
Cartwright, N. (2009). “Causal Laws, Policy Predictions, and the Need for Genuine Powers.” In T. Handfield (Ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, pp. 127–157. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199558933.003.0005.
2008
Cartwright, N. (2008). “If No Capacities then No Credible Worlds. But Can Models Reveal Capacities?” Erkenntnis, 70(1), pp. 45–58. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9136-8.
Cartwright, N. (2008). “In Praise of the Representation Theorem.” In M. Frauchiger and W. K. Essler (Eds.), Representation, Evidence, and Justification: Themes from Suppes. Ontos Verlag, pp. 83–90. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110323566.83.
Cartwright, N. (2008). “Replies.” In S. Hartmann, C. Hoefer and L. Bovens (Eds.), Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
Chang, H. and Cartwright, N. (2008). “Measurement.” In S. Psillos and M. Curd (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge, pp. 367–375. Reprinted in M. Curd and S. Psillos (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (Second Edition). Routledge, pp. 411–419.
Suarez, M. and Cartwright, N. (2008). “Theories: Tools versus Models.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39(1), pp. 61–81. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2007.05.004.
2007
Cartwright, N. and Frigg, R. (2007). “String Theory under Scrutiny.” Physics World, 20(9), pp. 14–15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1088/2058-7058/20/9/24.
Cartwright, N. (2007). “What Makes a Capacity a Disposition?” In M. Kistler and B. Gnassounou (Eds.), Dispositions and Causal Powers. Ashgate, pp. 195–205.
Cartwright, N. (2007). “Counterfactuals in Economics: A Commentary.” In J. K. Campbell, M. O’Rourke and H. S. Silverstein (Eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press, pp. 191–216. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1753.003.0012. Reprinted in N. Cartwright (2007), Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge University Press, pp. 236–261.
Cartwright, N. (2007). “Are RCTs the Gold Standard?” BioSocieties, 2(2), 11–20. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1745855207005029.
2006
Cartwright, N. (2006). “Well-Ordered Science: Evidence for Use.” Philosophy of Science, 73(5), pp. 981–990. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/518803.
Cartwright, N. (2006). “Against the ‘System’.” In C. Engel and L. Daston (Eds.), Is There Value in Inconsistency?. Nomos, pp. 17–38.
Cartwright, N. (2006). “Where is the Theory in our ‘Theories’ of Causality?” Journal of Philosophy, 103(2), pp. 55–66. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2006103227. Reprinted in N. Cartwright (2007), Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–56.
Cartwright, N. (2006). “From Metaphysics to Method: Comments on Manipulability and the Causal Markov Condition.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(1), pp. 197–218. Reprinted in N. Cartwright (2007), Hunting Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics. Cambridge University Press, pp. 132–151.
Cartwright, N. (2006). “From Causation to Explanation and Back.” In B. Leiter (Ed.), The Future of Philosophy. Oxford Clarendon Press, pp. 230–245. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199247288.003.0010.
2005
Cartwright, N. (2005). How Can We Know What Made the Ratman Sick? Singular Causes and Population Probabilities. In A. Jokić (Eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Physics, and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum. New York: Prometheus Books. Also in Causality: Metaphysics and Methods Technical Report CTR 08-03. CPNSS, LSE.
Cartwright, N., Alexandrova, A., Efstathiou, S., Hamilton, A. and Muntean, I. (2005). Laws. In M. Smith, and F. Jackson (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (2005). No God; No Laws. In E. Sindoni, S, Moriggi (Eds.), Dio, la Natura e la Legge. God and the Laws of Nature. Milan: Angelicum-Mondo X.
Cartwright, N. (2005). The Vanity of Rigour in Economics. Theoretical Models and Galilean Experiments. In P. Fontaine, and R. Leonard (Eds.), The ‘Experiment’ in the History of Economics. Expanded version in (1999) The Vanity of Rigour in Economics, Discussion Paper Series. CPNSS, LSE. Translated to German as Die Vergeblich Strenge der Oekonomie –Theoretische Modelleund Galileische Experimente. In (2012) L. Bauer, and K. Hamberger (Eds.), Gesellschaft Denken Eine erkenntnistheoretische Standortbestimmung der Sozialwissenschaften. Wien: Springer Verlag. Also in Nancy Cartwright (2007). Hunting Causes and Using Them.
Cartwright, N. (2005). Another Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics. In Y. Ben-Menahem (Eds.), Hilary Putnam. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (2005). My Understand to Philosophy [sic]. In K Ouyang (Eds.), Dang dai Ying Mei zhu ming zhe xue jia xue shu zi shu [The Academic Self-Statements of Contemporary British and American Distinguished Philosophers]. Beijing: Ren min chu ban she. Publication in Chinese.
2004
Cartwright, N. and Reiss, J. (2004). Uncertainty in Econometrics: Evaluating Policy Counterfactuals. In Mooslechner, P., Schuberth, H., and Schurz, M. (Eds.), Economic Policy Under Uncertainty: The Role of Truth and Accountability in Policy Advice. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing LTD.
Cartwright, N. (2004). Causation: One Word, Many Things. Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 71:805-819. Also in Causality: Metaphysics and Methods Technical Report CTR 07-03, CPNSS, LSE. Also in Nancy Cartwright (2007). Hunting Causes and Using Them.
2003
Cartwright, N. (2003). Two Theorems on Invariance and Causality. Philosophy of Science, 70(1):203-224. Also as a longer version in (2000) Measuring Causes: Invariance, Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition, Measurement in Physics and Economics Discussion Paper Series Monograph DP MEAS 10/00, London: CPNSS, LSE. Also in Nancy Cartwright (2007). Hunting Causes and Using Them.
2002
Cartwright, N. (2002). Introduction, and Reply. Philosophical Books (dedicated to Nancy Cartwright’s The Dappled World), 43(4):241-244; 271-279.
Cartwright, N. (2002). Against Modularity, the Causal Markov Condition and Any Link Between the Two: Comments on Hausman and Woodward. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53:411-453. Also as a shorter version in (2000) Measuring Causes: Invariance, Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition, Measurement in Physics and Economics Discussion Paper Series Monograph DP MEAS 9/00, London: CPNSS, LSE. Also in Nancy Cartwright (2007). Hunting Causes and Using Them.
Cartwright, N. (2002). In Favour of Laws that are Not Ceteris Paribus After All. Erkenntnis, 57:425-439. Also in Nancy Cartwright (2007). Causal Powers.
2001
Cartwright, N., Psillos, S. and Chang, H. (2001). Theories of Scientific Method: Models for the Physico-Mathematical Sciences. In M.J. Nye, (Eds.), The Cambridge History of Science, Volume 5: Modern Physical and Mathematical Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (2001). Reply to P. Anderson’s ‘Review of The Dappled World’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 32(3):495-497.
Cartwright, N.(2001). What is Wrong with Bayes Nets? The Monist, 84(2):242-264. Also in (2000) Measuring Causes: Invariance, Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition, Measurement in Physics and Economics Discussion Paper Series Monograph DP MEAS 9/00, London: CPNSS, LSE. Also in expanded form in (2003) H. Kyburg, M. Thalos, (Eds.), Probability Is the Very Guide of Life. Chicago: Open Court.
Cartwright, N. (2001). Modularity: It Can – and Generally Does – Fail. In D. Costantini, M.C. Galavotti, P. Suppes (Eds.), Stochastic Dependence and Causality. California: CSLI. Also in (2000) Measuring Causes: Invariance, Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition, Measurement in Physics and Economics Discussion Paper Series Monograph DP MEAS 9/00, London: CPNSS, LSE.
2000
Cartwright, N. (2000). Quantum Mechanics without the Observables. In E. Agazzi, M. Pauri, (Eds.), The Reality of the Unobservable: Observability, Unobservability, and their Impact on the Issue of Scientific Realism. Dortrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Cartwright, N. (2000). An Empiricist Defence of Singular Causes. In R. Teichmann, (Eds.), Logic, Cause and Action: Essays in Honour of Elizabeth Anscombe. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. and Suárez, M. (2000). Endpiece. Theoria, 15:123-128.
Cartwright, N. (2000). Against the Completability of Science. In J. Wolff, M.W.F. Stone, (Eds.), The Proper Ambition of Science. New York: Routledge. Also in C. Mataix, A. Rivadulla, (Eds.), (2002). Fisica Cuantica y Realidad. Quantum Physics and Reality, Madrid: Facultad de Filosofia Universidad Complutense.
1999
Cartwright, N. (1999). The Limits of Exact Science, from Economics to Physics. Perspectives on Science, 7(3):318-336. Republished with minor changes as (2002) The Limits of Causal Order, from Economics to Physics, in U. Maki, (Eds.), Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1999). Causal Diversity and the Markov Condition. Synthese, 121(1/2):3-27.
Cartwright, N. (1999). Models and the limits of theory: quantum Hamiltonians and the BCS model of superconductivity. In M. Morgan, M. Morrison, (Eds.), Models as Mediators. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1999). Comments and Replies. In M. Paul, (Eds.), Proceedings of the Münster Colloquium.
Cartwright, N. (1999). Capacities. In J.B. Davis, D.W. Hands, U. Mäki, (Eds.), The Handbook of Economic Methodology. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
1998
Cartwright, N. (1998). Causality, Independence and Determinism. In A. Gammerman, (Eds.), Causal Models and Intelligent Data Analysis. London: Springer Verlag.
Cartwright, N. (1998). How Theories Relate: Takeovers or Partnerships? Philosophia Naturalis, 35:23-24.
Cat, J. and Cartwright, N. (1998). Neurath, Otto (1882–1945). Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
1997
Cartwright, N. (1997). Comment on ‘Harold Hotelling and the Neoclassical Dream’. In R. Backhouse, U. Mäki, A. Salanti, D. Hausman, (Eds.), Economics and Methodology. New York: Macmillan and St Martin’s Press.
Cartwright, N. (1997). Why Physics? In R. Penrose, M. Longair, (Eds.), The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1997). Models: The Blueprints for Laws. Philosophy of Science, 64:292-303.
Cartwright, N. and Del Seta, M. (1997). The Myth of Universalism: Theories of Science and Theories of Justice, Discussion Paper Series, CPNSS, LSE.
Cartwright, N. (1997). Where Do Laws of Nature Come From? Dialectica, 51:65-78. Translated as D’ou viennent les lois de la nature? In C. Chauvire, A. Ogien, (Eds.), La Regularite. Habitude, disposition et savoir-faire dans l’explication de l’action. Paris: EHESS.
Cartwright, N. and Uebel, T.E. (1997). Philosophy in the Earthly Plane. In E. Nemeth, F. Stadler, (Eds.), Encyclopaedia and Utopia: The Life and Work of Otto Neurath, Münster: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Cartwright, N. (1997). What is a Causal Structure? In V.R. McKim, S.P. Turner, (Eds.), Causality in Crisis? Statistical Methods and the Search for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
1996
Cartwright, N. and Cat, J. (1996). Neurath Against Method. In R.N. Giere, A. Richardson, (Eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, XVI. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Cartwright, N. and Kitcher, P. (1996). Science and Ethics: Reclaiming Some Neglected Questions. Perspectives on Science, 4(2):145-153.
1995
Cartwright, N. (1995). Ceteris Paribus Laws and Socio-Economic Machines. The Monist, 78(3):276-294. Reprinted in U. Maki, (Eds.), The Economic World View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1995). False Idealization: A Philosophical Threat to Scientific Method. Philosophical Studies, 77:339-352.
Cartwright, N. (1995). How Laws Relate What Happens: Against a Regularity Account. In H. Stachowiak, (Eds.), Pragmatik: Handbuch Pragmatischen Denkens Band V. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Cartwright, N., Cat, J. and Chang, H. (1995). Otto Neurath: Politics and the Unity of Science. In P. Galison, D. Stump, (Eds.), The Disunity of Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1995). Entries on Neurath, Duhem, Feyerabend and Lakatos. In E. Honderich, (Eds.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1995). Précis of Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Symposium on Nancy Cartwright’s Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement), 55(1):153-156.
Cartwright, N. (1995). Reply to Eells, Humphrey and Morrison. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Symposium on Nancy Cartwright’s Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement), 55(1):177-187.
Cartwright, N., Shomar, T. and Suarez, M. (1995). The Tool Box of Science: Tools for the Building of Models with a Superconductivity Example. In W.E. Herfel, W. Krajewski, I. Niiniluoto, R. Wojcicki, R., (Eds.), Theories and Models in Scientific Processes. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Cartwright, N. (1995). Quantum Technology: Where to Look for the Quantum Measurement Problem. Philosophy and Technology: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1995). Causal Structures in Econometrics Models. In D. Little, (Eds.), On the Reliability of Economic Models. Münster: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Cartwright, N. (1995). Where in the World is the Quantum Measurement Problem? In L. Kruger, B. Falkenburg, (Eds.), Physik, Philosophie und die Einheit der Wissenschaften: Grundlagen der exakten Naturawissenschaften. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag.
Cartwright, N. (1995). Probabilities and Experiments. Journal of Econometrics, 65(1):47-59. Also in Discussion Paper Series, CPNSS 3/94.
1994
Cartwright, N. (1994). Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws. In M. Soteriou, (Eds.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Reprinted in D. Papineau, (Eds.), The Philosophy of Science. Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1994). The Metaphysics of the Disunified World. Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2:357-364.
Cartwright, N. and Hoefer, C. (1994). Substantivalism and the Hole Argument. In J. Earman, A. Janis, G. Massey, N. Rescher, (Eds.), Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays Concerning the Philosophy of Adolf Grünbaum, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
1993
Cartwright, N. (1993). Marks and Probabilities: Two Ways to Find Causal Structure. In F. Stadler, (Eds.), Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Developments, Yearbook 1/93, Institute Vienna Circle, Münster: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Cartwright, N. (1993). How We Relate Theory to Observation. In P. Horwich, (Eds.), World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cartwright, N. and Chang, H. (1993). Causality and Realism in the EPR Experiment. Erkenntnis, 38:169-190.
Cartwright, N. (1993). Mill and Menger: Ideal Elements and Stable Tendencies. In U. Maki, (Eds.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 38.
Cartwright, N. (1993). Is Natural Science ‘Natural’ Enough? A Reply to Phillip Allport. Synthese, 94:291-301.
Cartwright, N. (1993). In defence of `this worldly’ causality: Comments on Van Fraassen’s laws and symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53(2):423-429.
1992
Cartwright, N. (1992). Aristotelian Natures and the Modern Experimental Method. In J. Earman, (Eds.), Inference, Explanation and Other Philosophical Frustrations. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
1991
Cat, J., Chang, H. and Cartwright, N. (1991). Otto Neurath: Unification as the Way to Socialism. In J. Mittelstraβ, (Eds.), Einheit der Wissenschaften, New York: Walter de Gruyter. Translated into Spanish as Otto Neurath: Unificacion Como la Via Hacia el Socialismo, Cuadermos, 90.
Cartwright, N. (1991). Fables and Models. Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society Supplement, 65:55-68. Reprinted in J. Worrall, (Eds.), (1991). The Ontology of Science, Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth.
Cartwright, N. and Jones, M. (1991). How to Hunt Quantum Causes. Erkenntnis, 35(1/3):205-231.
Cartwright, N. (1991). Replicability, Reproducibility, and Robustness: Comments on Harry Collins, History of Political Economy, 23(1):143-155.
Cartwright, N. (1991). Can Wholism Reconcile the Inaccuracy of Theory with the Accuracy of Prediction? Synthese, 89(1):3-13.
1990
Cartwright, N. (1990). Quantum Causes: The Lessons of the Bell Inequalities. In P. Weingärtner, G. Schurz, (Eds.), Philosophy of the Natural Sciences: Proceedings of the 13th International Wittgenstein Symposium.
1989
Cartwright, N. (1989). The Born-Einstein debate: Where application and explanation separate, Synthese, 81(3):271-282.
1988
Cartwright, N. (1988). A Case Study in Realism: Why Econometrics is Committed to Capacities. Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2:190-197.
Cartwright, N. (1988). Capacities and Abstractions. In P. Kitcher, W.C. Salmon, (Eds.), Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Dupre, J. and Cartwright, N. (1988). Probability and Causality: Why Hume and Indeterminism Don’t Mix. Nous, 22(4)521-536.
Cartwright, N. (1988). How to Tell a Common Cause: Generalisations of the Conjunctive Fork Criterion. In J.H. Fetzer, (Eds.), Probability and Causality, Dortrecht: D. Reidel.
Cartwright, N. (1988). “Regular Associations and Singular Causes.” In B. Skyrms and W.L. Harper (Eds.), Causation, Chance and Credence (Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation Volume 1). Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 79–97. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2863-3_5.
Cartwright, N. (1988). “Reply to Ellery Eells.” B. Skyrms and W.L. Harper (Eds.), Causation, Chance and Credence (Proceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation Volume 1). Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 105–108. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2863-3_7.
Cartwright, N. (1988). Ursachen und Mathematische Physik. In W. Muschik, E. Scheibe, (Eds.), Philosophie, Physik, Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Berlin: Technische Universität Berlin. (Translated from Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement).
1987
Cartwright, N. (1987). Max Born and the Reality of Quantum Probabilities. In L. Krüger, G. Gigerenzer, M. Morgan, (Eds.), The Probabilistic Revolution vol II. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books.
Cartwright, N. (1987). Philosophical Problems of Quantum Theory: The Response of American Physicists. In L. Krüger, G. Gigerenzer, M. Morgan, (Eds.), The Probabilistic Revolution vol II. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books.
1986
Cartwright, N. (1986). Fitting Facts to Equations. In R. Grandy, R. Warner, (Eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories and Ends. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cartwright, N. (1986). Two Kinds of Teleological Explanation. In A. Donagan, A. Perovich, M. Wedin, (Eds.), Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. Dortrecht: D. Reidel.
1984
Cartwright, N. (1984). Causation and Physics: Causal Processes and Mathematical Derivations. Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2:391-404.
Cartwright, N. and Mendell, H. (1984). What Makes Physics’ Objects Abstract? In J.T. Cushing, C.F. Delaney, G.M. Gutting, (Eds.), Science and Reality. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
1983
Cartwright, N. (1983). When Explanation Leads to Inference. Philosophical Topics, 13:111-121.
Cartwright, N. (1983). How the Measurement Problem is an Artefact of Mathematic. In R. Swinburne, (Eds.), Space, Time and Causality. Dortrecht: D. Reidel.
Cartwright, N. and Nordby, J. (1983). How Approximations Take Us Away From Theory and Towards the Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64:273-280.
1980
Cartwright, N. (1980). “Measuring Position Probabilities.” In P. Suppes (Ed.), Studies in the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Cartwright, N. (1980). “The Truth Doesn’t Explain Much.” American Philosophy Quarterly, 17(2), pp. 159–163.
Reprinted in D. Rothbart (Ed.), (1997). Science Reason & Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Harcourt Brace. Reprinted in E.D. Klemke, R. Hollinger, and D.W. Rudge, (Eds.), (1998). Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science (3rd ed), Prometheus. Reprinted in J. McErlean, (Ed.), (1999). Philosophies of Science: From Foundations to Contemporary Issues, Wadsworth.
Cartwright, N. (1980). “The Reality of Causes in a World of Instrumental Laws.” Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1980(2), pp. 38–48. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1980.2.192585.
Reprinted in R. Boyd, P. Gaspar, J. Trout, (Eds.), (1991). The Philosophy of Science.
Cartwright, N. (1980). “Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?” Pacific Philosophy Quarterly, 61(1-2), pp. 64–75. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1980.tb00005.x.
Reprinted in Y. V. Balashov, (Ed.), (1980). The Philosophy of Science Reader, Routledge. Reprinted in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (Eds.), (1998). Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, W.W. Norton & Company Ltd. Reprinted in J.W. Carroll (Ed.), (2004). Readings on Laws of Nature, University of Pittsburgh Press.
1979
Cartwright, N. (1979). “Do Token-Token Identity Theories Show Why We Don’t Need Reductionism?” Philosophical Studies, 36(1), pp. 85–90. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354384.
Cartwright, N. (1979). “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies.” Noûs, 13(4), pp. 419–437. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2215337.
Cartwright, N. (1979). “Philosophy of Physics.” In P. D. Asquith and H. E. Kyburg (Eds.), Current Research in Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the PSA Critical Research Problems Conference. Philosophy of Science Association.
1978
Cartwright, N. (1978). “The Only Real Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1978(1), pp. 54–59. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1978.1.192625.
Cartwright, N. (1978). “Comments on Wesley Salmon’s ‘Science and Religion’.” Philosophical Studies, 33(2), pp. 177–183. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00571885.
1977
Cartwright, N. (1977). “The Sum Rule Has Not Been Tested.” Philosophy of Science, 44(1), pp. 107–112. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/288727.
1975
Cartwright, N.D. (1975). “A Non-Negative Wigner-Type Distribution.” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 83(1), pp. 210–212. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4371(76)90145-X.
1974
Cartwright, N. (1974). “How Do We Apply Science?” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 32, pp. 712–719. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1974.495834.
Cartwright, N. (1974). “Superposition and Macroscopic Observation.” Synthese, 29: pp. 229–242. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00484959. Reprinted in P. Suppes (Ed., 1976), Logic and Probability in Quantum Mechanics (Synthese Library, vol 78). Springer, pp. 221–234.
Cartwright, N. (1974). “Correlations Without Joint Distributions in Quantum Mechanics.” Foundations of Physics, 4(1), pp. 127–136. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00708563.
Cartwright, N. (1974). “Van Fraassen’s Modal Model of Quantum Mechanics.” Philosophy of Science, 41(2), pp. 199–202. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/288585.
1972
Cartwright, N. (1972). “A Dilemma for the Traditional Interpretation of Quantum Mixtures.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 20, pp. 251–258. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1972.3698972.
Book Reviews
‘The History of Econometric Ideas: Historical Perspective on Modern Economics’, Mary Morgan, Cambridge University Press, 1990. Philosophy of Science (1993), 60(3):515-516.
‘Laws and Symmetry’, Bas C van Fraassen, OUP, 1989. The Times Higher Education Supplement, March 1990.
‘The Shaky Game: Einstein, Reality and the Quantum Theory’, Arthur Fine, University of Chicago Press, 1987. Isis (1987), 78(2):274-275.
‘Quantum Theory and Measurement’, John Wheeler and Wojciech Zurek (Eds.), Princeton University Press, 1983. Philosophy of Science (1985), 52(3):480-481.
‘The Investigation of the Physical World’, Giuliano Toraldo di Francia, Cambridge University Press, 1983. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1983), 34(3):310-312.
‘The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics’, Michael Audi, University of Chicago Press, 1973. The Philosophical Review, (1977), 86(3):394-396.
‘Paradigms and Paradoxes’, Robert Colodny, Pittsburgh Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. V, 1974. Philosophy of Science, (1974), 41(2):207-209.
‘Quantum Theory and Beyond’, Ted Bastin, 1972. Philosophy of Science, (1972), 39(4):558-560.